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Emotional Distress Damages For
Cancerphobia:' A Case For the
DES Daughter2
Recent years have evidenced an increased dissemination of cancer
related information to the public This information explosion is, in
large part, a product of increased television, radio and newspaper cov-
erage of the medical field.' As a result of this increased media coverage
of cancer, a person could become preoccupied with his or her own can-
cer risk. Since most people have no objective basis for their fears, any
emotional distress suffered due to thoughts of developing cancer is not
likely to be legally compensable. This situation, however, is very dif-
ferent for the DES daughter.'
The DES daughter is an innocent victim of the harmful effects of
Diethylstilbestrol (DES), a drug that was formerly administered to wo-
1. The term cancerphobia appeared in the case Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 19, 176
N.Y.S.2d 996, 998, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1958). Cancerphobia was used to describe a phobic
reaction or apprehension that was experienced by the plaintiff, due to her fear of contracting
cancer in the future. The medical definition of a phobic reaction, however, is the recurrent
experience of dread of a specific event or object in the absence of objective danger. See P.
SOLOMON & V. PATCH, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 77 (3rd ed. 1974). The term cancerphobia in
this comment will refer to an anxiety rather than a phobia. Anxiety is defined as a normal
response to threats towards one's body, possessions, way of life, loved ones or cherished values.
Id at 50.
2. The DES daughter is a term used to describe the female offspring of women who were
administered the drug diethystilbestrol (DES) during their pregnancy. DES was later withdrawn
from the market for the use by pregnant women after it was discovered to be associated with
abnormalities among the user's offspring. See generally, Comment, DES anda Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liablli, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Enterprise
Liabil y]; see also Comment, The DES Labyrinth, 33 S.C.L. REv. 663 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Labyrinth].
3. See generally Goldberg, Who Knows Best, the Doctor or the Reporter, 30 T.V. GUIDE 43
(Nov. 27-Dec. 3, 1982).
4. See id at 44.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 52-57 (discussion of the problems experienced by the
DES daughter). The scope of this comment will be focused on the emotional distress suffered by
the female offspring of the women who were administered DES. There is some evidence, how-
ever, indicating that male offspring may also suffer physical abnormalities of their reproductive
system as a result of DES. See Gill, Schumacher & Bibbo, Structural andFunctionalAbnormalities
in the Sex Organs of Male Offspring of Mothers Treated with Diethystilbestrol (DES), 16 J.
REPROD. MED. 147, 152-53 (1976). Lawsuits have been initiated by DES sons against the drug
manufacturers for damages that resulted from the drug. See Johnson & Dowie, Revenge of a DES
Son, 8 MOTHER JONES, February/March 1982, at 33. A DES son faces the possibilities of devel-
opig testicular cancer, a disease that results in the removal of his testicles. See Sacramento Bee,
Jan. , 1983, at 11, col. 2. For the purposes of this comment, the cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress that is made for the DES daughter may also apply to the DES son.
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men during pregnancy to prevent miscarriages.6 Once DES is adminis-
tered to pregnant women, the drug permeates the fetus resulting in a
100 times greater risk of contracting the deadly cancer, clear-cell ade-
nocarcinoma, among the daughters exposed to DES in ulero than
among the general population.7 After learning that she faces an in-
creased statistical likelihood of contracting vaginal cancer, the DES
daughter may become anxious and emotionally upset despite not hav-
ing discovered any physical signs of cancer.8 The cause of her emo-
tional distress is the knowledge that she belongs to a special class of
women more likely to suffer one of several abnormalities of her repro-
ductive organs than is the general population.9 This emotional distress,
however, derives not only from her fears of contracting the deadly can-
cer, but also from her fears of the treatment and consequences of the
cancer.10 The treatment in virtually all cases is radical surgery and a
major consequence of the surgery is the possibility of becoming
sterile. "
Since the discovery of the relationship between the use of DES and
cancer, the manufacturers of DES have been subjected to numerous
lawsuits instituted by DES daughters who suffered a physical injury
linked to their prenatal exposure to the drug."2 Although these DES
daughters have fought an uphill battle in litigation against the drug
manufacturers for personal injury damages, a few DES daughters have
overcome the many legal barriers to win compensation for their physi-
cal injuries.' 3 The California Supreme Court has been a leader in af-
fording DES daughters their day in court.'" In particular, the court
instituted an innovative tort theory to help the DES daughter prove her
case against the drug manufacturers.' 5 To date, however, there has
been no legal recourse for the DES daughter cancerphobia claimant
6. See infra text accompanying notes 20-22.
7. See Comment, Labyrinth, supra note 2, at 697. This particular fact becomes even more
astonishing since clear-cell adenocarcinoma was infrequently reported prior to the DES linked
cases. Id There have been more than 400 clear-cell adenocarcinoma cases reported as of 1982.
See Johnson & Dowie, supra note 5, at 32. DES causes cancer in approximately one to four per
thousand DES daughters. See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 2 at 965.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 157-66.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 40-51.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 40-51.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 44-51.
12. There have been estimates that as many as 1,000 lawsuits were in the nation's courts in
1980. See Podges, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability Field, 66 A.B.A. J. 827, 827 (1980). In
1982 there were 373 lawsuits against Eli Lilly & Co. alone. See Johnson & Dowie, supra note 5, at
41.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 70-103.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 88-96. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
15. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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absent the manifestation of a physical injury. 6 The major obstacles in
the DES daughter's claim for cancerphobia harbor in her inability to
comply with the rigid requirements set forth by previous case law and
unfavorable public policy factors.
This comment will determine whether California case law and public
policy permits a DES daughter to maintain a cause of action against
the manufacturers of DES for negligent infliction of emotional distress
resulting from the fear of developing cancer. 7 The emotional distress
explored will be the anxiety that results from a DES daughter's fear of
developing cancer in the future. '8 This comment will demonstrate that
the DES daughter has a viable cause of action regardless of whether
she ever develops cancer as a result of DES.I9 A discussion of the drug
manufacturers' liability for the physical injuries suffered by the DES
daughter will show their legal responsibility to compensate the DES
daughter. Following this discussion will be an analysis of the current
state of the law in the emotional distress area. The focus of this com-
ment, however, will be upon the application of an emotional distress
16. See generally Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982). This is only one of
very few reported cases in which DES daughters attempted to recover emotional distress damages
prior to developing cancer. See also Mink v. University of Chicago and Eli Lilly & Co., 77-C-
1432 (1983) (The jury returned a verdict against the plaintiff), Reeves, Fear not Enough, 69 A.B.A.
J. 725, 725 (1983).
17. This comment examines negligently inflicted emotional distress. A DES manufacturer
can also be held liable on the basis of theories other than negligence. See infra text accompanying
notes 60-61. This, however, should present no problem for the DES daughter's case for emotional
distress. An emotional distress cause of action can also be based upon other tort theories such as
strict liability and warranty. See Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 21, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 612, 615 (1977). The court in Shepard stated that the basis for permitting a cause of action
on these other theories is that a person's emotional distress is just as foreseeable in a cause of
action based on defects in manufacture or design, as it is for negligence. Id at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr.
at 615. The Supreme Court of Iowa similarly held that a cause of action for emotional distress
would lie when a court held a defendant liable based on strict liability or breach of warranty
theories. See Walker v. Clark Equipment Co., 320 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1982).
18, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 comment j (1965), defines severe emotional dis-
tress as "all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea."
19, The focus of this comment will be on the cancerphobia cause of action initiated by the
DES daughter. A cause of action for cancerphobia, however, may also arise under similar factual
circumstances in which a defendant's wrongful conduct places a plaintiff in fear of a serious physi-
cal injury in the future. See, e.g., Comment, Products Liability ofthe 1980:r: Repose is not the
Destiny of Manufacturers, 61 N.C.L. REv. 33, 35 (1982) (asbestos cases may give rise to
cancerphobia causes of action due to the latent nature of the cancer). See generally Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974); Vagley & Blanton, Aggregation of
Claims: Liabilityfor Certain Illnesses with Long Latency Periods Before Manifestation, 16 FORUM
636, 637 (1981); Comment, Labyrinth, supra note 2, at 692-693. Exposure to harmful radiation
may also create a situation causing a person to suffer cancerphobia. Currently there is litigation
concerning governmental liability for the physical injuries caused by exposure to the atomic test-
ing of the 1950's and 1960's. See L.A. Daily J., Oct. 12, 1982, at 5, col. 3; see also Comment,
Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the Burden ofProof on Factual Causation, 32
HASTINGs L.J. 933, 938-43 (1981). Lastly, exposure to dangerous chemicals that cause latent
physical injuries may also give rise to a cancerphobia cause of action similar to the DES daugh-
ter's case. See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1980)
(exposure to the chemical defoliant agent orange); see also Sacramento Bee, Dec. 9, 1982, at 19,
col. 1 (current cancerphobia litigation resulting from exposure to the chemical DBCP).
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cause of action to the DES daughter suffering from cancerphobia. This
comment will conclude that a plaintiff can recover for her emotional
injuries that occur prior to developing cancer. To provide a clear un-
derstanding of a cause of action for cancerphobia, an initial discussion
of the drug DES and its effects on the DES daughter is necessary.
DIETHYLSTILBESTROL
An inquiry into the actions taken by the DES manufacturers prior to
and during their marketing of DES should demonstrate their culpabil-
ity. Additionally, this examination into their marketing practices will
become helpful in a later discussion of policy limitations on their liabil-
ity for cancerphobia.
A. Marketing History
Diethystilbestrol,2 ° commonly known as DES, is a synthetically pro-
duced estrogen that was used extensively by pregnant women from
1947 through 1971 to prevent miscarriages2' and spontaneous abor-
tions.22 The drug was developed by British scientists in the late
1930's.23 Following the development, American drug manufacturers
wished to manufacture and market DES in the United States. 4 The
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations re-
quired each drug manufacturer desiring to market DES to submit re-
ports to the FDA.25 These reports required manufacturers to conduct
their own research on the effects of the drug, a procedure that proved to
be extremely expensive.2 6 Consequently, in 1939, to facilitate the
processing of the applications, the FDA adopted a plan allowing the
drug manufacturers to pool their data for FDA approval.27 The FDA
20. DES is synthesized from a coal tar derivative and is two and one half times more potent
than natural estrogens. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628 (App. Div. 1982).
21. See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 2 at 963; see also DRUGS IN LITIGATION:
DAMAGE AWARDS INVOLVING PRESCRI'TION AND NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS 110 (2nd ed. 1981);
P. RHEINGOLD, DRUG LITIGATION, 107-111 (3rd ed. 1981) (a bibliography of medical articles
concerning the state of the art of DES). There is also some evidence that DES was administered
to pregnant women to promote healthier babies. Comment, iethyistilbestrol Extension of Federal
Class Action Procedures to Generic Drug Litigation, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 461, 461 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Diesthylstilbestrol].
22. See Johnson & Dowie, supra note 5, at 30. A spontaneous abortion is defined as an
expulsion of a human fetus during the first 12 weeks of gestation, whereas, a miscarriage is defined
as an expulsion of a human fetus between the 12th and 28th weeks of gestation. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 5 (1976).
23. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628 (App. Div. 1981). The drug was
used as a synthetic estrogen and had many advantages over previously produced synthetic estro-
gens. mainly DES was easily manufacturered and administered, while also being inexpensive to
produce. See Johnson & Dowie, supra note 5, at 30.
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adopted the plan and the manufacturers formed the "small committee"
to expedite application procedures.2 8 As a result, DES was approved in
1941 for limited use, however, none of the authorized uses related to
pregnancy. 9 Not until 1947, after the drug manufacturers filed supple-
mental applications, did the FDA approve DES for use by women ex-
periencing complications during pregnancy.30 The use of DES by
women during pregnancy was, however, approved only on an experi-
mental basis.3" The FDA required that DES be marketed with a label
warning users of the experimental nature of the FDA approval.32
From the year 1947 through 1971, DES was sold by hundreds of drug
companies 33 under nearly 100 brandnames.3 4 DES was prescribed to
an estimated 3 million women in the United States.3 5
Following the publication in 1971 of several scientific studies linking
the use of DES by pregnant women to vaginal cancer in their daugh-
ters, the FDA suspended the use of DES by pregnant women.3 6 The
FDA now requires DES to bear a warning label stating that its use by
pregnant women increases the risk of vaginal abnormalities in their off-
spring.37 The effects of these abnormalities vary among DES daugh-
ters.38 Most DES daughters will go through life without experiencing
any physical side effects from the drug. Those unlucky daughters,
however, who do suffer physical injury from the drug are faced with an
array of complications. The following section will elaborate on the
various complications DES daughters may face.
28. Id The "small committee" consisted of several volunteer representatives of the major
drug manufacturers. The committee was chaired by the representative of Eli Lilly & Co. The sole
purpose of the committee was to expedite the FDA application procedures. See also Comment,
Diethylstilbestrol, supra note 21, at 464.
29. Id
30. See Bichler, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
31. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 593, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133
(1980).
32. Id
33. The exact number of DES producers within the United States is unknown. The number
has been estimated from 94 to as many as 300. See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 2, at
964; see also McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Company, 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 81, 151 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733
(1978) (estimated that there were 142 manufacturers of DES). See DRUG LITIGATION, supra note
21, at 138, for a sample advertisement placed by a DES manufacturer to promote the sale of DES
to pregnant women.
34. See Johnson & Dowie, supra note 5, at 41.
35. See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 2, at 964-65. Some estimates have been as
high as 6 million women. See Johnson & Dowie, supra note 5, at 30.
36. See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 2, at 965-66. DES still is being used for a
number of other purposes. Id at 963. Complaints have alleged that as early as 1938 the drug
manufacturers were aware of the ineffectiveness of DES as a miscarriage preventative. One pub-
lished report stated that DES could even cause miscarriage or abortion, not prevent them. See
Bichler, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
37. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1011 (33rd ed. 1979). Today, Eli Lilly & Co. is the
only listed manufacturer of DES. Id
38. See infra text accompanying notes 34-57.
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B. The Effects of DES
Since 1938, there have been numerous scientific studies examining
the harmful effects of DES.39 Recently completed tests demonstrate
that from 30 to 90 percent of the women exposed to DES have vaginal
adenosis,40 a benign condition, and epotheial changes in the vagina and
cervix.4 1 Vaginal adenosis is almost unknown in the normal popula-
tion of women in this age group.42 A DES daughter in whom adenosis
is positively identified must be monitored by bioposy at least twice a
year, a procedure that can be both painful and expensive.43
Aside from the benign condition caused by DES, use of the drug also
has been linked to vaginal clear-cell adenocarcinoma, 4 a fast spread-
ing and deadly disease calling for a treatment of radical surgery or ra-
diation therapy.4 The benign condition of adenosis is found in over 97
percent of the patients who later develop clear-cell adenocarcinoma 6
Due to the malignant nature of clear-cell adenocarcinoma, frequent ex-
aminations are required to insure early detection.47 If the cancerous
condition is detected in its early stages, a hysterectomy and vaginec-
tomy are required. Surgical treatment of the cancer may cause the
DES daughter to suffer from one of several complications. 49 Some of
these complications include lack of bladder control, increased suscepti-
bility to bladder infection, and pain during intercourse.5 0 If the cancer
is detected in its later stages, the cancerous condition may result in
death.51
In addition to the severe physical injuries suffered by the DES
daughter, she also faces the possibility of suffering emotional harm.52
39. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1011 (33rd ed. 1979); see also RHEINGOLD, supra
note 21, at 261 (a sample physician's report on the diagnosis of a woman who has DES related
complications). In the 1950's scientific studies reported that DES was not only ineffective as a
miscarriage preventative, but that DES mothers had an increased chance of a miscarriage. See
Bichler, 439 N.Y.S. 2d at 629, Johnson & Dowie, supra note 5, at 32.
40. Andenosis is a tissue placed abnormally in the vagina or cervix which results in greater
quantities of benign tissue as risk of malignant change. See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra
note 2, at 965-66.
41. Id
42. See Ulfelder, The Stilbestrol-.4dnenosis-Carcinoma Syndrome, 38 CANCER 426, 428
(1976).
43. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 26 Cal. 3d at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
Women suffering from this disease are required to undergo treatment consisting of cauterization,
surgery or cryosurgery. Id
44. See PHYSICIANs' DESK REFERENCE 1011 (33rd ed. 1979).
45. See Comment, Labyrinth, supra note 2, at 669.
46. See Ulfelder, supra note 42, at 428.
47. See Comment, Labyrinth, supra note 2, at 669.
48. Id at 664.
49. See Comment, Labyrinth, supra note 2, at 664.
50. See id
51. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 21, at 237 (a copy of a letter sent from Eli Lilly & Co.
reporting a DES related death to the FDA).
52. See Comment, LABYRINTH, supra note 2, at 664 "She becomes increasingly depressed
1220
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Specifically, she may suffer emotional distress as a result of actually
developing vaginal cancer.53 These emotional injuries occur contem-
poraneously with or subsequent to the physical injuries suffered due to
the cancer and its treatments. Her emotional distress, however, is not
limited to the distress accompanying the cancer. Emotional distress
also can be suffered prior to the development of cancer. 4 Specifically,
the DES daughter may suffer anxiety and apprehension in anticipation
of developing cancer.5 This cancerphobia also includes the fear of sur-
gery and the fear of sterility. 6 Cancerphobia experienced by the DES
daughter is the basis of her cause of action for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress 7.5  To understand the viability of this independent
tort action against the drug manufacturers, it is necessary to analyze the
current litigation involving the liability of DES manufacturers for the
DES daughter's physical injuries.
C. DES in Litigation
The determination of whether drug manufacturers are liable for the
physical injuries incurred by the DES daughter is critical in establish-
ing their liability for her emotional injuries sustained prior to develop-
ing cancer. If the cancerphobia claimant is unable to show the DES
manufacturers' culpability for her physical injuries, it is unlikely that
she will be able to establish liability for her emotional injuries. There-
fore, review of legal precedent concerning the liability of DES manu-
facturers for the DES daughter's physical injuries is important.
The gravamen of the complaints fied against the DES manufactur-
ers was a claim for compensation for the physical injuries caused by the
use of the drug. 8 Any allegations of emotional distress damages could
only be presented as parasitic damages, claims attached to the host
claims for damages for physical injuries. 9 Legal theories underlying
the host claims of the DES daughters have varied.6" Allegations di-
rected at the liability of the manufacturers have included doctrines of
(1) negligence, (2) strict liability, (3) violation of expressed or implied
warranties, (4) false and fraudulent representations, (5) misbranding of
over her inability to bear children, anxious about her frequent postsurgery examinations, and
fearful that her cancer might recur." Id
53. Id
54. See generally Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
55. Id
56. Id
57. See infra text accompanying notes 167-210.
58. See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
59. See Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 176; see also Rodriques v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d
509, 519 (1970).
60. Id; see RHEINGOLD, supra note 21, at 393 and 861 (sample complaints filed on behalf of
DES daughters).
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drugs in violation of federal law, (6) conspiracy, and (7) lack of con-
sent. 6 1 This comment will deal exclusively with an analysis of the drug
manufacturer's liability based on negligence. To assert successfully a
claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, the cancerphobia
claimant must first establish negligence.
L The Negligent DES Manufacturer
Prior to demonstrating that the drug manufacturers are liable for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the manufacturers' negligent
marketing of DES first must be established. A number of courts have
examined this negligence issue and concluded that the drug manufac-
turers were negligent both in failing to adequately test the drug for its
effects, and failing to warn users of the potential dangers of the drug.6,
The California Supreme Court addressed this issue by stating that the
negligence of the drug manufacturers is based upon the fact that they
"marketed and promoted DES as a safe and efficacious drug to prevent
miscarriage, without adequate testing or warning, and without moni-
toring or reporting its effects."63 The conclusion of the Court was predi-
cated on a number of facts. Specifically, the FDA originally authorized
the use of DES by pregnant women, but only on condition that the
drug carry a label warning users that DES was approved only on an
experimental basis.6' Despite this limited FDA authorization, the drug
manufacturers promoted the sale of DES on a large scale basis65 and
sold DES without the required warning label.6 6
Some courts, using information obtained by the drug manufacturers
from completed tests showing the harmful effects of DES, have held
that the manufacturers knew or should have known (1) DES is a carci-
nogenic substance, (2) administering a drug to pregnant women results
in that drug being transmitted to the fetus, and (3) there is a grave
danger after varying periods of time that DES will cause cancerous and
precancerous growths in daughters of women who were given the
drug.67 Courts also have held that the defendant drug manufacturers
knew or should have known that DES is ineffective as a miscarriage
preventative.68 Since this information could have been found through
proper testing some courts held DES manufacturers negligent for both
their failure to conduct adequate testing and to warn that the character-
61. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
62. See, e.g., Bichler, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630.




67. See id, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34.
68. Id
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istics of DES were not fully known.69
Although the DES daughter can readily establish negligent market-
ing, she faces several major impediments to her litigation.70 Some of
the potential problems that a DES daughter plaintiff must address are
issues of class action certification, statutes of limitation, collateral es-
toppel, and causation.7' The greatest roadblock to recovery encoun-
tered by the DES daughter is proving that the defendant drug
manufacturer named in her suit was the cause-in-fact of her injury. An
inquiry into this difficulty and the judicial solutions implemented to
alleviate the problem is necessary.
2 Proving Cause-in-Fact
The DES daughter, as a plaintiff, has the burden of proof in demon-
strating that an individual defendant drug manufacturer was the cause-
in-fact of her injury.72 To meet this burden, she must identify the ac-
tual drug manufacturer who produced the drug taken by her mother.73
The identification of the drug manufacturer presents an obstacle be-
cause she is often unable to obtain medical records and copies of pre-
scriptions. 74 The latency period between the ingestion of the drug and
the drug's harmful effects can be as long as twenty years; so, the large
passage of time plays a major role in her inability to recover records.75
Furthermore, the manner in which DES was marketed makes identifi-
cation of a specific manufacturer virtually impossible.76 DES was sold
as a generic substance, interchangeable regardless of brandname or
producer.77 Pharmacists simply filled prescriptions without taking note
of the brandname.78 This procedure has greatly hindered the DES
daughter's efforts in tracing the drug taken by her mother to a specific
manufacturer. 79 As a result, when confronted with this inability to
identify the actual manufacturer, the DES daughter failed to meet her
burden of proof8° and her case was nonsuited. 8'
69. Id; see also Bichler, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
70. See Comment, Labyrinth, supra note 2, at 668.
71. Id
72. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
73. See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 2, at 972.
74. Id
75. Id Physical harms, if they are manifested, usually do not occur until the DES daughter
reaches puberty. The latency period can be as long as 20 years. See Anderson, Watring, Edinger,
Jr., Netland & Safail, Development of DES Associated Clear Cell Carcinoma: The Importance of
Regular Screening, 53 OasTEr. & GYNEC. 293, 297 (1979).




80. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36.
81. See, e.g., McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 82-84, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 734-
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New and innovative tort theories were accepted by the courts in an
effort to remedy this inequity and to assist the DES daughter in over-
coming the identification problem. 82 There were several doctrines,
adopted by a number of jurisdictions, created to resolve the multiple
defendant problem faced by the DES daughter. Namely, the courts
have incorporated doctrines of concert of action,8 3 enterprise liability,8"
alternative liability85 and market share liability.86 The latter doctrine,
which is the approach adopted by the California Supreme Court,87
merits further examination.
The California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories88
created the doctrine of market share liability, thereby allowing the DES
daughter to circumvent the identification problem in proving cause-n-
fact.89 The court in Sindell adopted the principle enunciated by the
court in Summers v. Tice,90 placing the burden of proof for the issue of
causation upon the defendants. 91 The majority in Sindell noted the
role of the drug manufacturers in marketing DES as a fungible product
and the inability of identification being "no fault" of the plaintiffs as
reasons for shifting the burden of proof.9 2 Thus, under market share
liability, the defendant drug manufacturer has the burden of proving
that they did not produce the drug taken by the plaintiff's mother.
93 If
the drug manufacturer cannot exculpate itself, the manufacturer will
then be held liable for a part of the total damages awarded by the court
35 (1978), (recent California case that reached this result); see also Gray v. United States, 445 F.
Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
82. See generally Comment, Overcoming the Identiifeation Burden in DES Litigation: The
Market Share Liability Theory, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 609 (1982).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §876 (1979); see also, Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 633 (App. Div. 1981) (accepting the concert of action theory). This tort theory
was, however, rejected by the California Supreme Court in Sindell. The Court stated that an
acceptance of this theory to solve the identification problem would mean that "virtually any man-
ufacturer [could be held] liable for the defective products of an entire industry, even if it could
demonstrate that the product which caused the injury was not made by the defendant." Sindell,
26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
84. This theory was first suggested in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp.
353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 607, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142 (the
court rejected this theory in the DES daughters case).
85. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289 N.W.2d 20, 27 (Mich. App. 1979); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §433(B)(3) (1965). But cf. Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 512 F.
Supp. 1031 (D. Mass 1981) (the court rejected this theory in the DES daughter's case).
86. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
87. Id
88. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
89. See id at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
90. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1949). The plaintiff in Summers was injured when two hunters
negligently shot in his direction. Although the plaintiff was unable to prove which of the two
hunters fired the shot that struck him, they were held jointly liable for the loss if they could not
resolve the issue of cause-in-fact among themselves.
91. Id at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
92. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
93. Id at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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to the plaintiff.94 The amount of damages for which a particular de-
fendant drug manufacturer will be liable varies according to its share
of the total market of DES that was sold.95
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Sindell exhibits a
policy that negligent drug manufacturers should be held accountable
for the harms caused by DES. The California State Legislature acqui-
esced in the policy laid down by the court in Sindell by soundly defeat-
ing a proposal to dismantle market share liability.96 This defeat
signalled approval of the judicial policy permitting DES daughters to
recover damages for harms resulting from the drug manufacturers' neg-
ligence.97 In futherance of this policy, a California Appellate Court in
Miles Laboratory Inc. v. Superior Court,98 recently denied a motion for
summary judgment submitted by the drug manufacturer on the
grounds the manufacturer did not produce and promote DES for the
purpose for which it was eventually used.99 Miles Laboratory claimed
it produced DES for purposes other than for use by pregnant women
and should not be responsible for its misuse.'00 The court, however, in
subscribing to the policy set forth by the court in Sindell, refused to
allow the defendant drug manufacturer to escape liability.' In partic-
ular, the court stated that when a drug manufacturer knows a drug it
produces was being misused, and benefits from the misuse, the drug
manufacturer will be held liable for the harms caused by the known
misuse.102 In the instant case, Miles Laboratory knew the DES it pro-
duced was being used by pregnant women, notwithstanding the fact
they did not promote DES for this use.0 3
Now that liability under negligence for physical injuries has been
clearly established in California, recovery should be expanded beyond
physical injury where a plaintiff suffers emotional distress in legitimate
anticipation of physical injury. Liability for a DES daughter's physical
94. Id
95. Id
96. California State Senator Davis, in 1981, proposed Senate Bil 228 that would have added
to California Civil Code section 1714.91,
In any action based upon a product liability claim, a product seller shall not be liable to
any person, or person's heirs, successors, or assigns, unless the claimant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the product seller's own product caused the alleged
personal injury, death or property damage.
If this bill had become law, it would have effectively reversed the Sindell decision. This bill,.
however, was defeated in the Senate Judiciary Committee by a 5 to 2 vote on January 19, 1981.
Since that time, neither this bill, nor any similar proposal has been reintroduced.
97. Id
98. 133 Cal. App. 3d 587, 184 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1982).
99. Id at 593, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
100. Id at 592, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
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injuries provides a doctrinal underpinning upon which a DES daughter
can base her cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The significance of this connection will become more appar-
ent in the next section. First, however, an action in emotional distress
must be explored.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The courts have rapidly evolved in recent years in the recognition of
a person's mental state as a protectable interest. The growth in this
cause of action, however, has been far from steady. This progression,
in a number of jurisdictions, has culminated in acceptance of negligent
infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort cause of ac-
tion.l'1 An understanding of the policies underlying this growth will be
helpful in the ultimate application of the cause of action to the DES
daughter.
Early decisions demonstrated a reluctance to award damages for
emotional harms.1 5 There were several reasons why the common law
courts hesitated in allowing recovery for this type of harm."0 6 The
overriding policy concerns focused on the dual desire of the courts to
hear only genuine claims and to prevent a flood of litigation.' 7 The
reluctance on the part of the common law courts against awarding
104. See infra text accompanying notes 139-147.
105. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §54, at 327-35 (4th ed.
1971).
106. See Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 933, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470,
481 (1975) (the belief that emotional injuries were trivial in nature); Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry.,
168 Mass. 285, 288, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) (claims for emotional distress presented a high possibil-
ity of fraudulent and vexatious lawsuits); Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (186 1) (it was too
difficult to place money damages on emotional injuries and that juries were incapable of distin-
guishing real from feigned injuries).
107. See PROSSER, supra note 105, §54, at 327. In order to guarantee the genuineness of the
claims, a physical impact or injury has generally been required prior to awarding damages for
emotional distress. See Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., Ill Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896).
Mental suffering alone would not afford a plaintiff a cause of action. Id Only under special
circumstances, was a plaintiff allowed to recover emotional distress damages absent a physical
injury. See PROSSER, supra note 105, §54, at 327-35. One special circumstance occurred when a
defendant's intentional conduct was deemed extreme and outrageous. Once this determination
was made, the court allowed recovery absent a physical injury because the nature of the act itself
insured the genuineness of the claim. See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468
P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970). In cases of "extreme and outrageous intentional inva-
sions of one's mental and emotional tranquility" the courts have awarded damages without the
need for the plaintiff to prove a physical injury. Id, see also Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal. App. 2d
472, 28 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1963); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Sillznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d
282 (1952), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 comment j (1965).
A second exception occurred under circumstances where a defendant's actions were of such a
shocking nature, that the courts have generally held the plaintiffs claim to be genuine. See gener-
ally, PROSSER, supra note 105, §54, at 328-30. Examples of these special circumstances are the
negligent delivery of a death notice, see Western Union Co. v. Cleveland, 160 Ala. 131, 53 So. 80
(1910); or the mishandling of a corpse, see Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948);
Carey v. Lima, Solmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1954).
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damages for emotional distress gradually subsided."°8 Dean Prosser
stated that the fears causing the early courts to deny recovery for emo-
tional injuries are not as prevalent today and, in general, the only valid
public policy objection to recovery for emotional harms is the "danger
of vexatious suits and fictitious claims."' t 9 Modernly, the courts have
been unsettled as to the conditions required to bring an action for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress." 0° Although there is no gen-
erally accepted standard for recovery, the California Supreme Court
appears to be committed to a liberal, factually oriented approach to
recovery. The following section analyzes the current criteria set forth
by the courts in California for recovery in an emotional distress cause
of action.
A. California Recovery for Emotional Distress
In recent years, the California Supreme Court has expanded the pa-
rameters of an action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
beyond the boundaries of permissible recovery in a majority of juris-
dictions."' The protection of the mental tranquility of an individual
has been enlarged by two landmark decisions of the California
Supreme Court, Dillon v. Legg1" in 1968 and Molien v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hospitals""' in 1980. The court in Dillon rejected the fears re-
tained by the common law courts which acted as a barrier to many
potentially valid claims." 4 The court stated that the fear of fraudulent
claims "[did] not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of
108. Modernly, the plaintiff in a majority of jurisdictions does not have to suffer a physical
impact in order to recover emotional distress damages. Rather a plaintiff must establish that he or
she is within the "zone of danger". See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §436 (1965). The
"zone of danger" test, a judicially imposed screening device, was designed to exclude fraudulent
claims by requiring a plaintiff to be within a zone of actual harm, and be in fear of their own
personal safety. See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 310-11, 379
P.2d 513, 522-23, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 42-43 (1963) (overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)).
Although the physical impact rule has been eliminated by the majority ofjurisdictions, a major-
ity of courts still require that the plaintiff manifest a resulting physical injury as a consequence of
their emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §436A (1965) states:
If an actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bod-
ily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such disturbance alone,
without bodily harm or compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such a
disturbance.
The courts have retained this requirement as a way to minimize the risk of fraudulent claims and
to avoid unlimited liability. See Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896).
109. See PROSSER, supra note 105, §54, at 328.
110. See generally Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons after
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 13 PAC. L.J. 179, 183-88 (1980).
Ill. Id at 184.
112. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
113. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
114. See 68 Cal. 2d at 736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
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claims in which that potentiality arises."' 1 5 The California courts have
attempted to resolve the problems inherent in emotional distress ac-
tions in a number of ways.' t6 Following a series of recent decisions, the
standards required to bring an action for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress are in a clouded state.117 The present state of the
law will be clarified after an analysis of several of the more significant
elements required to establish a prima facie case for the negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress.
To establish a successful cause of action for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant owed
the plaintiff a duty of care for the particular injury sustained.' 18 Cali-
fornia views the concept of duty in terms of the foreseeability of risk
presented."t 9 Therefore, the plaintiffs in an action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress must show that the emotional distress
they suffered was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's ac-
tion. 120 There are two distinct tests currently available for determining
if emotional distress was foreseeable.' 2' The status of the plaintiff will
determine which of the two tests to employ. A plaintiff seeking recov-
ery can allege either that the emotional distress was caused by the de-
fendant's actions which harmed a third person 22 or that the emotional
distress was caused by a defendant's direct action against the plain-
tiff.'23 The Dillon court's analysis focused on the former situation, and
the latter was examined by the court in Molien.
Specifically, the majority in Dillon established a set of guidelines for
determining whether a duty was owed to a percipient witness plain-
tiff.'2 4 The plaintiff in Dillon did not fear for her own safety, yet the
court awarded her damages for the emotional distress that resulted
from witnessing an injury to a third person. 25 The court extended the
boundaries of a duty owed to a new class of potential plaintiffs that had
been arbitrarily denied recovery under the "zone of danger" test be-
cause the limitation of duty under the old test achieved unjust re-
115. Id
116. See Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 935, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470,
482 (1975).
117. See Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emergingfrom
Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 583 (1982).
118. See PROSSER, supra note 105, §53, at 324-27.
119. See 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
120. Id
121. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
122. See 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
123. See 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
124. See 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
125. Id The Court in Dillon allowed a mother, who witnessed her daughter's death in an
automobile accident, to recover damages for her emotional distress that she suffered as a result of
witnessing her daughter's injury. Id
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sults.1 26 The court set forth guidelines to be employed in determining
whether the emotional distress of a percipient witness is foreseeable.127
In particular, the court stated that emotional distress is foreseeable
when the plaintiff shows (1) close proximity to the scene of the acci-
dent, (2) contemporaneous sensory perception, and (3) a close relation-
ship to the primary victim.128
In regard to the direct victim of the defendant's action, the analysis
of duty differs.'2 9 To establish that a duty is owed to a direct victim,
the standards set out by the court in Molien must be applied. 3 ° Rather
than relying on a set of rigid guidelines, the court in Molien applied
general principles of foreseeability to the facts at hand to determine if a
duty existed. 3 ' Therefore, based on the rationale in Molien, the court
must decide on a case-by-case basis whether the risk of harm to the
plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable.' 3 2 The court stated that once the
plaintiff demonstrates foreseeability of the emotional distress, the de-
fendant owes the plaintiff a duty of due care.' 33
In addition to establishing duty as an element of the plaintiff's prima
facie case, the plaintiff also must prove he or she actually suffered a
harm.' 34 The general standard in the majority of jurisdictions for prov-
ing harm is that the plaintiff show he or she sustained a physical in-
jury.'35 This requirement of a physical injury was, however, eliminated
by the California Supreme Court in Molien.' 3 6 In Molien the court
recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent
tort cause of action. 37 The court expressly rejected the principles set
forth in early common law decisions by stating "the unqualified re-
quirement of physical injury is no longer justifiable."'1 38
In Molien, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered emotional distress as
a result of the defendant's negligent diagnosis of his wife's condition. 139
126. Id A number of other jurisdictions that have similarly allowed emotional distress dam-
ages for a percipient witness. See, e.g., Leong & Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974);
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1301 (Mass. 1978). But see Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969).
127. See 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
128. Id
129. See 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
130. Id at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
131. Id
132. Id at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
133. Id
134. See PROSSER, supra note 105, §30, at 143.
135. See supra note 107; see also BAi No. 12.80 (6th ed. 1977).
136. See 27 Cal. 3d at 928,,616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838; accord Rodrigues v. State, 52
Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433,
438 (Me. 1982).
137. See 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
138. Id at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
139. Id at 918, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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She was misdiagnosed as having an infectious type of syphilis.'4 ° Con-
sequently, the plaintiff was informed by his wife that the defendant
physician requested he come in for blood tests to determine if he also
had syphilis.' The defendant's negligence resulted in the plaintiff's
serious emotional distress, but the emotional distress was unaccompa-
nied by any physical manifestations of his distress. 42 Nevertheless, the
court permitted the plaintiff to recover damages, describing the physi-
cal injury requirement as "an anachronism",'43 and concluded that
emotional injury was just as debilitating as physical injury and was "no
less deserving of redress."'"
The majority in Molien embraced a new standard for establishing a
plaintiff's harm. Under this new standard, a plaintiff need simply
demonstrate that his or her emotional distress is serious.1 45 The court
characterized serious emotional distress as a debilitating harm that
could be shown by proof that "a reasonable man, normally constituted,
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered
by the circumstances of the case."' 46 The issue of serious emotional
distress is a matter of proof for jury determination. 47
The above-mentioned principles outline the basic approach followed
by the California courts for establishing a cause of action for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. Before the discussion shifts to the
application of California law to the DES daughter's case, a separate
inquiry must be made into the situation of a plaintiff who suffers emo-
tional distress as a result of a present fear of a future harm. Although
the same elements are required for an emotional distress action for the
fear of a future harm as well as for a present harm, the latter situation
requires some special consideration.
B. Recovery for a Present Fear of a Future Harm
Courts in general have long recognized that anxiety due to a fear of a
future harm may constitute a proper element of damages. 48 In partic-
ular, the courts have been especially appreciative of the mental anguish
stemming from sensitive personal concerns such as cancer. 49 As early
140. Id
141. Id
142. Id at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
143. Id at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
144. Id
145. Id at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
146. Id at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38 (citing Rodriques, 52 Hawaii 156,
173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)).
147. See 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
148. Seegenerall, Jones v. United R. Co., 54 Cal. App. 744, 202 P. 919 (1921) (suffered emo-
tional distress as a result of a fear of permanent disability in the future).
149. See generaly Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Penn. 1951) (the plaintiff re-
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as 1951, a Federal District court allowed a plaintiff to recover damages
for cancerphobia caused by a defendant's wrongful conduct.150  In
Dempsey v. Hartley,15 ' the court recognized the reasonableness of a
plaintiff's fears that she may develop cancer in the future.'52 The dam-
ages awarded were a derivative of, or an element of, a claim for physi-
cal injuries.' 53 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New York inFerrara
v. Galluchio 'I acknowledged that the fear of developing cancer, which
the plaintiff reasonably supposed would result from her physical injury,
was considered a proper element in recovery.' 55 In Ferrara, the plain-
tiff received damages for her emotional suffering that was a conse-
quence of her susceptibility to contracting cancer due to a negligent X-
ray treatment she received from her physician.' 56 These cases clearly
represent a judicial acceptance of emotional distress recovery for
cancerphobia as an element of damages in actions praying for compen-
sation for a severe physical injury.
Conversely, various state courts have rejected claims for
cancerphobia, absent the severe physical injury. 157 In a recent decision,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Payton v. Abbott Labora-
tories,15 8 denied recovery in a class action suit filed on behalf of 4,000
Massachussetts DES daughters.' 59 Like all DES daughters, these
plaintiffs faced an increased statistical likelihood of developing vaginal
cancer.' 60 Therefore, they claimed they suffered emotional distress'
6 1
and attempted to recover under an independent tort claim for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress against the drug manufacturers.1
62
The court, however, refused to recognize the cause of action because
the plaintiffs lacked proof of harm.'63 The court required that there
ceived serious breast injuries in an automobile accident and feared that she may develop breast
cancer).
150. Id
151. 94 F. Supp. 918 (1951).
152. Id at 921.
153. Id at 920.
154. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958).
155. Id at 21, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999, 152 N.E.2d at 252.
156. Id
157. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
158. 437 N.E.2d 171.
159. Id at 181.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 39-5 1.
161. Many plaintiffs are anxious and emotionally upset by the possibility that they will
suffer one of several abnormalities of their reproductive organs or will contract clear-cell
adenocarcinoma, which are conditions they are more likely to develop than the general
population. On the advice of their physicians, some plaintiffs are submitting to periodic
medical examinations so as to permit early detection of problems. These examinations
may be expensive and traumatic.
Pay/ton, 437 N.E.2d at 191.
162. Id at 164.
163. Id at 173.
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must be some physical manifestation of emotional distress in order to
prove actual harm.'" The majority of states, including Massachusetts,
requires a physical injury before allowing emotional distress dam-
ages.' 65 As previously stated, this is not the law in California.166 The
next section will consider the essential factors for a successful claim for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress and analyze their applica-
bility to an emotional distress cause of action by the DES daughter who
suffers cancerphobia.
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: RECOVERY FOR
THE DES DAUGHTER SUFFERING CANCERPHOBIA
The determination as to whether a DES daughter can recover for her
emotional injuries in California, absent any physical manifestation of
the cancer, or of the emotional distress, is best luminated by consider-
ing the prima facie elements of duty and harm separately. For the pur-
poses of the analysis, this discussion will assume (1) the DES daughter
has already established the negligence of the drug manufacturers in
their marketing DES as a miscarriage preventative'67 and (2) the DES
daughter has overcome the identification problem associated with the
multiple defendants through market share liability.16 8 The inquiry will
first turn to the issue of duty.
A. A Duty Owed to the DES Daughter
The determination of whether the drug manufacturers' duty to the
DES daughter extends to an obligation to refrain from creating an un-
reasonable risk to her emotional state must first be explored. As a part
of this determination, the DES daughter must address any possible spe-
cial limitations of the duty that is owed to her. For example, a number
of jurisdictions impose limitations on the duty of defendants in cases of
unborn persons as plaintiffs.' 69 This presents a special problem since
the negligent actions of the drug manufacturers occurred while the
164. Id at 180.
165. See supra note 108. The Payton court relied upon Massachussetts law. See Agis v. How-
ard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 143-45, 355 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (1976) (Massachusetts rule of no
recovery without a physical injury). ThePayton court concluded that in order for the DES daugh-
ter to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress that has resulted from
cancerphobia, the plaintiff must prove the following elements: (I) negligence, (2) emotional dis-
tress, (3) causation, (4) physical harm manifested by objective symplomatology, and (5) that a rea-
sonable person would have suffered emotional distress under the circumstances of the case. See
Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 181 (emphasis added).
166. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 88-95.
169. See PROSSER, supra note 105, §55, at 335-38. These limitations arise from common law
decisions that have held that there can be no recovery for injuries to a fetus. See, e.g., Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
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DES daughter was a fetus.' 7 ° In California, however, there is no limi-
tation of duty towards prenatal plaintiffs. California gives statutory
recognition to the fetus' independent legal existence. '7 I California Civil
Code section 29 was adopted to create a cause of action for the benefit
of the child'72 and is potentially limitless in scope. 73 This does not,
however, automatically establish that a duty is owed to the child.
Rather, the DES daughter must still establish all of the prima facie
elements, including duty, before she can recover.
Notwithstanding any special limitations, a duty exists if it was rea-
sonably foreseeable a defendant's actions would create an unreasona-
ble risk to the plaintiff's well-being.' 74 Thus, the DES daughter must
demonstrate the defendant drug manufacturers should have reasonably
foreseen that, by producing a drug that created a risk of cancer in the
user's offspring, the offspring would suffer emotional distress as a result
of the risk. Because foreseeability is the critical inquiry, the court must
decide whether to apply the guidelines set forth in Dillon 175 or the stan-
dard set forth in Molien 176 to determine if the DES daughter's emo-
tional distress was foreseeable. To answer this question an
examination of the status of the DES daughter plaintiff is required.
The DES daughter suffers emotional distress as a result of a threat to
her health attributable to the increased risk of developing cancer.'
77
Therefore, her status as a plaintiff would be a direct victim rather than
a percipient witness. Consequently, the DES daughter should meet the
standard elaborated by the court in Molien.' 78  Hence, to establish a
duty, the pertinent facts surrounding the case of the DES daughter
must be applied to the general principles of foreseeability.1" 9 Foresee-
ability is described best as an appreciation of the risk.' Expressed in
other terms, a result is foreseeable when a defendant knew or should
have known his or her actions created a risk.' 81 Accordingly, foresee-
ability of the DES daughter's emotional distress requires a two-step
170. See supra text accompanying notes 36-5 1.
171. See CAL. CIV. CODE §29. Section 29 provides that a "[c]hild conceived, but not yet born,
is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its
subsequent birth .. "
172. See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 98, 268 P.2d 178, 180 (1954).
173. See Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 631-32, 92 P.2d 678, 679-80 (1939).
174. See supra note 118.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 167-99.
178. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. The court in Molien
stated that in cases when a plaintiff is a direct victim of the defendant's action, the guidelines in
Dillon are apposite, but not controlling. Id
179. See 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
180. See generally PROSSER, supra note 105, §31, at 145.
181. Id
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analysis. The first step is to determine whether the physical injuries
sustained by the DES daughter were foreseeable. If they were, the sec-
ond step analyzes whether the emotional distress caused by the DES
daughter's fear of those physical injuries was also foreseeable.
Inquiry into the foreseeability of the physical injuries suffered by the
DES daughter is unnecessary since the courts have resolved the issue in
favor of the DES daughter.182 Namely, the court in Bichler x, Eli Lil y
& Co. 183 examined this issue and concluded that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the DES daughter would suffer physical harms as a
result of her mother ingesting DES.'84 The court in Bichler based its
decision on the fact that the drug manufacturers had the means to test,
and only their failure to conduct the tests prevented discovery of the
cancer risk inherent in DES.'85 Therefore, the defendant drug manu-
facturer knew or should have known the risks of physical injury they
created by promoting DES for use by pregnant women.'
86
Although the Bichler court established the foreseeability of physical
injury, the DES daughter undertakes a more arduous task in demon-
strating the second step, the foreseeability of her emotional distress
which results from the fear of physical injury. The daughter must
prove the drug manufacturers knew or should have known the in-
creased risk of vaginal cancer in DES daughters would cause serious
emotional distress.'87 The Court of Appeals of New York, in Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 11 facing a similar question, answered in the affirmative. 89
The Ferrara court permitted a plaintiff to recover damages for emo-
tional distress due to her fear of developing cancer in the future.'90
The plaintiff in Ferrara received a series of X-ray treatments from the
defendant physician.' 9' After her treatment, the X-rayed area began to
blister and form scabs.' 92 The plaintiff subsequently consulted a der-
matologist who informed her that the area blistering was prone to be-
coming cancerous due to the negligent X-ray treatment she had
received. 93 In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that she had suffered
182. See supra text accompanying notes 68-78.
183. 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1981).
184. Id at 634-35.
185. Id
186. The jury in Bichler at the conclusion of the trial returned a general verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, determining that the DES daughter's physical harms were foreseeable. No. 65534 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 24, 1980).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 118-120.
188. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958).
189. Id at 21, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 1000, 152 N.E.2d at 253.
190. Id
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emotional distress as a result of her doctor's negligent X-ray treat-
ment.'94 The court held "[i]t is entirely plausible, under such circum-
stances, that plaintiff would undergo exceptional mental suffering over
the possibility of developing cancer." '195
The factual circumstances underlying the conclusion of the court
that the plaintiffs' emotional distress was foreseeable in Ferrara and
Molien are in many respects similar to those of the DES daughter. In
Molien the plaintiff feared he had syphilis,' 9 6 even though he later dis-
covered his fears were without foundation.197 In Ferrara the plaintiff
feared she would develop skin cancer.' 98 Similarly, the DES daughter
dreads developing a deadly vaginal cancer.'99 All of the feared physi-
cal injuries are very serious, and all of the plaintiffs suffered extreme
emotional distress as a result of their fears of future serious physical
injury. Therefore, a potential defendant should foresee that placing a
person in fear of serious physical injury would logically result in the
person suffering emotional distress. Consequently, a DES daughter
who becomes aware of the high probability that she will develop cancer
and as a result, suffers emotional distress, is a foreseeable plaintiff with
foreseeable injuries. By establishing that her emotional distress was
foreseeable, it can be concluded that the defendant drug manufacturers
owed a duty to the DES daughter to avoid presenting unreasonable
risks to her emotional well-being. With the duty of the manufacturer
toward the DES daughter now established, the next step will be to
demonstrate that the daughter suffered actual harm, and that the harm
was legally compensable.
B. A DES Daughter's Harm
The old California prima facie requirement of harm in an emotional
distress action would have acted automatically to preclude a large
number of DES daughters from recovery."° This exclusion would
have been the case because the daughters had not yet developed cancer
to evidence a harm, or because no manifestation of a physical injury
had occurred as a result of the emotional distress.20 1 As previously
194. Id
195. Id at 21, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 1000, 152 N.E.2d at 253. Similarly, the court in Molien ad-
dressed the issue of foreseeability of emotional distress and concluded that a person would suffer
emotional distress when the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff to fear the possibility of phys-
ical injury. See 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. The court based this
finding on the fact that the defendants "knew or should have known that their diagnosis, that the
plaintiff's wife had syphilis, and that he might also have the disease would cause him emotional
distress." Id
196. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
197. See 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
198. See Ferrara. 5 N.Y.2d at 19, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 998, 152 N.E.2d at 251.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 157-65.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
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discussed, however, the court in Molien enumerated a new standard for
determining harm in an emotional distress cause of action. 20 2  The
court rejected the physical injury requirement and instead required that
plaintiff show his or her emotional distress was serious.203 The court
construed a serious emotional distress to mean a debilitating harm, and
included within serious emotional distress conditions such as "traumat-
ically induced neurosis, phychosis, chronic depression, orphobia.' '2 4
Courts use a reasonable person standard to determine if the emotional
distress is serious.2 0 ' Therefore, the DES daughter must demonstrate
that a reasonable woman would be unable to cope with the mental
stress which is induced by her fear of developing vaginal cancer.216
To prove that her emotional distress is reasonable, the DES daughter
must show objective reasons for suffering cancerphobia. 0 7 Objective
reasons for the daughter's belief that the use of DES leads to vaginal
cancer can be shown by (1) information furnished to her by her physi-
cian regarding the link between DES and cancer,20 8 (2) information
widely disseminated by public media relating to the increased likeli-
hood that the DES daughter will develop cancer, 20 9 and (3) informa-
tion published in scientific reports.21 0  All of these sources,
corroborated by the fact that the DES daughter is confronted with the
likelihood of developing a potentially fatal vaginal cancer leads to the
conclusion that the DES daughter facing this threat is entirely reason-
able in suffering emotional distress. Nevertheless, establishing the
prima facie elements for an emotional distress cause of action will not
assure a DES daughter a favorable judgment. After she has demon-
strated a duty, a harm, negligence, and causation, a DES daughter
must finally address any possible policy limitations which may arise to
bar her cause of action against the drug manufacturers.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 136-47.
204. See 27 Cal. 3d at 933, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis added).
205. See supra note 146.
206. See supra note 146.
207. See PROSSER, supra note 105, §32, at 150.
208. See, e.g., Ferrara, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999, 152 N.E.2d 249, 253 (the
plaintiff learned from her physician that her shoulder was susceptable to becoming cancerous).
209. See Sacramento Bee, Jan. 25, 1983 at col. 2. In current litigation concerning
cancerphobia resulting from exposure to the Chemical DBCP, a trial judge stated that as objective
reasons for the emotional distress, the plaintiff could offer into evidence newspaper and television
reports that led the plaintiffs to link the chemical with cancer.
210. See Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918, 921 (1951). The court stated that it was en-
tirely reasonable for the person to suffer emotional distress, due to the information that had been
published in Cancer News, which the plaintiff read. Id at 921. An example of literature that was
distributed to women to warn them of the possible harms resulting from DES, is a booklet that
was published by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. This booklet warned wo-
men who think they could be DES daughters to see their physicians as soon as possible. See
RHEINCOLD, supra note 21, at 198-99.
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C Public Policy Considerations
Specifically, a DES daughter may hear the argument that the exten-
sion of an emotional distress cause of action to encompass her
cancerphobia case against the drug manufacturers would contravene
public policy.2"1 Courts have subscribed to several public policy argu-
ments that stand for the proposition that it is best not to hold drug
manufacturers liable for the harms they have caused.212 The argu-
ments against imposing liability include the great social benefit derived
from new pharmaceuticals, the need to have drugs that have unavoid-
ably dangerous side effects, and the need to continue a high level of
industry investment in drug research and development.2 13 This policy
of limiting the liability has been expressed in the Restatement of
Torts2 14 and in the courts.21 -5
This public policy argument, however, was rejected by the California
Supreme Court in Sindell.21 6 In Sindell, the court refused to limit the
imposition of liability of the drug manufacturers despite the suggestion
of the Restatement of Torts.217 The reasons for this are simple. The
Restatement of Torts states that public policy justifies the use of unsafe
products notwithstanding their high degree of risk, but only where a
proper warning label is attached.218 The DES manufacturers cannot
hide surreptitiously behind "public policy" in light of their actions in
the promotion of DES for the sale to pregnant women. The drug man-
ufacturers marketed DES in violation of the limited authorization
granted by the FDA by promoting DES on an unlimited basis rather
than the required experimental basis, and by selling DES without
warning the users of the potential dangers. 21 9 The court has stated that
liability for damages will cease at a point dictated by public policy or
common sense.22° Although, in general, public policy tends to favor
limitation on a drug manufacturer's liability, common sense under
these circumstances dictates that the DES manufacturers should be
given no special deference.




214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment k (1965).
215. See supra note 211.
216. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 599, 607 P.2d 924, 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 (1980).
217. Id
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
220. See Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 262, 270, 190 N.E. 487, 488 (1934).
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CONCLUSION
A scrutiny of recent case law governing recovery for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress in California has demonstrated a pro-
gressive expansion in the protections afforded the emotional interests
of individuals. The traditional barriers that consistently have barred
valid claims have been slowly dismantled by the courts. This comment
has demonstrated that within this larger framework, a new class of po-
tential plaintiffs now is able to state a cause of action and have the
opportunity to recover damages which were until recently, unrecover-
able. This class of plaintiffs, DES daughters who suffer emotional dis-
tress prior to developing cancer, is now able to meet the standards
dictated by the courts for an independent cause of action based on their
cancerphobia.
In accordance with the standards establishing a duty of care, the
DES daughter will be able to prove that the DES manufacturers knew
or should have known that a risk was created to the DES daughters'
mental tranquility. The DES daughter may demonstrate that the man-
ufacturers owe her a duty, and that they are required to refrain from
violating her mental interests. The daughter will also be able to meet
the standards of the court for proving harm, even though she has
neither developed cancer, nor manifested physical injuries as a result of
her emotional distress. Since the abolishment of the antiquated physi-
cal injury requirement in California, no serious bar will hinder a DES
daughter's claim.
The California Supreme Court has broadened its acceptance of emo-
tional distress claims to the point that a DES daughter may recover
damages from a negligent defendant who has caused her to suffer
cancerphobia. The fears experienced by the DES daughter causing
emotional distress are not only real, but they also are among the worst
possible fears a person can endure. The DES daughter is uncertain as
to what the future holds in store for her. She does not know if she will
develop cancer in the future, nor does she know if she will ever be able
to bear children. These fears are the direct result of the drug manufac-
turers who negligently marketed a dangerous and ineffective drug. Al-
lowing these manufacturers to escape liability would create a grave
injustice, especially in the face of the manufacturers' flagrant disregard
of the limited authorization of DES by the FDA.
The California Supreme Court, in recognizing the injustice created
by allowing the drug manufacturers to escape liability for the DES
daughters' physical injuries, adopted a new doctrine of market share
liability to alleviate the problem. This new doctrine should not present
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problems for the DES daughter cancerphobia claimant. Her emotional
distress damages fit within the theory as it was expounded by the court
in Sindell. Market share liability is a doctrine conceived by the courts
directed towards causation and the apportionment of damages, and not
the ultimate legal responsibility owed to the DES daughter. A DES
daughter's recovery for damages that result from her emotional injuries
can be apportioned among the negligent drug manufacturers just as
damages for physical injuries are apportioned. This at first may appear
to be an extention of market share liability beyond the original intent
of the court in Sindell. The courts, however, have already been award-
ing damages to DES daughters suffering emotional distress as parasitic
damages to their claims for physical injuries and apportioning these
damages among the negligent drug manufacturers. Now it is time for
the courts to award damages for the DES daughters' emotional injuries
that occur prior to their developing the cancer.
Corey Scott Cramin
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